Singletary’s Formula for Success through 12 Games
AUTHOR'S NOTE: If you're interested, here is my statistical matchup review of the Seahawks game.
Welcome back for this week's look at how the 49ers are doing according to Mike Singletary's Formula for Success. For those that don't remember Singletary's Formula for Success, here it is:
- Total Ball Security
- Execute
- Dominate the Trenches
- Create Good Field Position
- Finish
The first thing I'll say is, "Don't worry. This isn't another equation-heavy measurement statistics article." OK. With that out of the way - and most of you still around - I'll repeat that, given the large sample sizes at this point in the season, don't expect too much fluctuation in any of the Formula-related stats I present today. Instead, it's most important to focus on the changes in these stats as compared to last week.
In today's post, I'll first present updated Adjusted BS Rates - along with their components - for each NFL team. Then, as I did last week, I'll use one gigantic table to present all of the stats that measure the other 4 ingredients of Singletary's Formula for Success. Of course, as has been the case of late, I'll provide some brief commentary along the way
After the jump, a pile of BS followed by a heaping helping of formula ingredients...
ADJUSTED BS RATES
Below you'll find Adjusted Ball Security (BS) Rates, Unadjusted BS Rates, Fumble Rates (FR), Interception Rates (IR), and Adjusted IRs for each NFL team through 12 games (Niner stats and top 8 for each category in bold; bottom 8 for each category in italics):
|
Team |
Adj BS Rate |
Last Wk |
BS Rate |
Rk |
FR |
Rk |
IR |
Rk |
Adj IR |
Rk |
|
|
1 |
MIN |
98.70% |
1 |
98.78% |
1 |
1.24% |
2 |
1.19% |
1 |
1.43% |
3 |
|
2 |
NE |
98.61% |
2 |
98.35% |
3 |
1.41% |
3 |
2.11% |
8 |
1.34% |
2 |
|
3 |
MIA |
98.21% |
3 |
97.75% |
14 |
1.99% |
12 |
2.86% |
18 |
1.32% |
1 |
|
4 |
SD |
98.18% |
6 |
98.39% |
2 |
1.62% |
4 |
1.60% |
3 |
2.24% |
7 |
|
5 |
IND |
98.15% |
5 |
98.30% |
4 |
1.20% |
1 |
2.60% |
13 |
3.02% |
19 |
|
6 |
ATL |
98.05% |
7 |
97.77% |
11 |
1.73% |
6 |
3.24% |
24 |
2.38% |
8 |
|
7 |
PHI |
98.01% |
11 |
98.08% |
7 |
1.80% |
8 |
2.15% |
9 |
2.39% |
9 |
|
8 |
DAL |
97.98% |
13 |
97.92% |
9 |
2.27% |
21 |
1.69% |
5 |
1.53% |
4 |
|
9 |
DEN |
97.95% |
4 |
98.21% |
5 |
1.66% |
5 |
2.07% |
7 |
2.88% |
15 |
|
10 |
NO |
97.90% |
12 |
97.73% |
15 |
2.14% |
17 |
2.55% |
12 |
2.01% |
6 |
|
11 |
GB |
97.90% |
8 |
98.18% |
6 |
1.90% |
10 |
1.65% |
4 |
2.54% |
10 |
|
12 |
BAL |
97.83% |
9 |
97.94% |
8 |
1.75% |
7 |
2.68% |
15 |
3.04% |
20 |
|
13 |
HOU |
97.78% |
10 |
97.75% |
13 |
1.80% |
9 |
3.15% |
23 |
3.07% |
21 |
|
14 |
JAC |
97.71% |
14 |
97.82% |
10 |
2.47% |
25 |
1.54% |
2 |
1.90% |
5 |
|
15 |
STL |
97.68% |
15 |
97.70% |
16 |
2.00% |
13 |
2.91% |
19 |
2.99% |
18 |
|
16 |
CIN |
97.60% |
17 |
97.77% |
12 |
2.03% |
15 |
2.74% |
17 |
3.32% |
23 |
|
17 |
NYG |
97.57% |
16 |
97.65% |
19 |
2.18% |
19 |
2.73% |
16 |
2.96% |
17 |
|
18 |
SF |
97.55% |
18 |
97.70% |
17 |
2.32% |
22 |
2.27% |
10 |
2.71% |
11 |
|
19 |
CLE |
97.47% |
23 |
97.32% |
22 |
2.09% |
16 |
3.97% |
26 |
3.49% |
24 |
|
20 |
PIT |
97.44% |
19 |
97.67% |
18 |
2.00% |
14 |
3.02% |
21 |
3.75% |
25 |
|
21 |
ARI |
97.35% |
22 |
97.54% |
20 |
2.38% |
23 |
2.61% |
14 |
3.16% |
22 |
|
22 |
TEN |
97.33% |
21 |
97.30% |
23 |
2.59% |
27 |
2.95% |
20 |
2.85% |
14 |
|
23 |
BUF |
97.32% |
20 |
97.15% |
25 |
2.17% |
18 |
4.41% |
27 |
3.86% |
27 |
|
24 |
WAS |
97.21% |
25 |
97.10% |
26 |
2.82% |
29 |
3.07% |
22 |
2.72% |
12 |
|
25 |
SEA |
97.15% |
26 |
97.47% |
21 |
2.83% |
30 |
1.96% |
6 |
2.88% |
16 |
|
26 |
KC |
97.12% |
24 |
97.28% |
24 |
2.91% |
32 |
2.30% |
11 |
2.81% |
13 |
|
27 |
DET |
96.98% |
27 |
96.94% |
28 |
1.91% |
11 |
5.30% |
30 |
5.18% |
31 |
|
28 |
NYJ |
96.98% |
31 |
96.63% |
31 |
2.46% |
24 |
5.96% |
32 |
4.62% |
29 |
|
29 |
CAR |
96.97% |
29 |
96.78% |
29 |
2.23% |
20 |
5.57% |
31 |
4.91% |
30 |
|
30 |
TB |
96.95% |
28 |
96.48% |
32 |
2.69% |
28 |
5.21% |
29 |
3.77% |
26 |
|
31 |
OAK |
96.78% |
32 |
96.95% |
27 |
2.83% |
31 |
3.55% |
25 |
4.11% |
28 |
|
32 |
CHI |
96.56% |
30 |
96.72% |
30 |
2.54% |
26 |
4.72% |
28 |
5.18% |
32 |
If you don't know what each of these stats mean, see my detailed explanation here.
One thing I forgot to mention last week is that the 49ers actually have the best Adjusted BS Rate among the 4 NFC West teams. So, if Total Ball Security is one of the mechanisms via which Mike Singletary envisions his team winning the division (at some point in my lifetime), then they're well on their way when it comes to avoiding fumbles and interceptions.
Of course, you wouldn't exactly expect that given the 49ers' fumbling woes against the Seahawks and the Cardinals stellar play of late. However, the reason why they remained at #18 this week should be pretty apparent. Namely, their 2 fumbles against the Seahawks, although costly during that particular game, constituted only 2 of their 76 fumbling opportunities in Week 13 (2.63%); and, more importantly, they represented only 2 of their 777 total fumbling opportunities through 12 games (0.26%). Essentially, those 2 fumbles didn't affect the overall stats that much because of the large sample size.
Nevertheless, although it may not have affected their Adjusted BS Rate very much, their fumble-prone (and interception-averse) performance against SEA did affect their component rankings in two ways. First, they dropped from 21st to 22nd in FR because their 2.63% FR on Sunday was still higher than their 2.28% FR going into Sunday's game. Second, their IRs moved up considerably in the rankings: their IR ranking rose from #13 to #10 and their Adjusted IR ranking rose from #17 to #11.
Why the big leap in IRs? Well, it's pretty simple, Alex Smith threw 0 INTs in 45 passes against SEA, and 0.00% is as good as it gets with respect to IR. What's interesting to me about the 49ers being the 10th- or 11th-best team in terms of avoiding INTs -and this should not shock you whatsoever - is that their decrease in IR has coincided perfectly with their increase in the use of shotgun, as well as their increase in passing frequency. Here's a useful table to illustrate this point:
|
Time Frame |
% Shotgun |
Passes per Game |
INTs |
IR |
|
Through 9 Games |
37.1% |
30.9 |
8 |
2.88% |
|
Through 10 Games |
40.0% |
31.1 |
9 |
2.89% |
|
Through 11 Games |
41.5% |
32.0 |
9 |
2.56% |
|
Through 12 Games |
43.3% |
33.1 |
9 |
2.27% |
Why is this interesting to me? Well, in football, it's pretty much the conventional wisdom that more passing leads to a higher IR. Likewise, the conventional wisdom among anti-shotgun Niner fans is that more shotgun leads to a higher IR. From this table, we can see that, since SF implemented their shotgun OFF for the first time against GB, their IR has clearly defied the conventional wisdom; it's actually getting better! Indeed, over the past 3 games, Alex Smith has thrown only 1 INT in 119 passes, for an astonishingly microscopic IR of 0.84%. What's even more amazing about Smith's nearly "total" ball security is that the last 3 shotgun- and passing-heavy games have come against teams that have an average defensive IR of 3.51% (average ranking = 12th). Ho hum, just another meaningless piece of evidence that shotgun-haters are going to ignore when they argue that the Niners need to go back to running the ball or the West Coast Offense or whatever it is this week. I look forward to hearing your denials in the comments section.
As for the rest of the NFL, the biggest leapers this week were the Eagles and Cowboys, who ascended into the top 8 at the expense of the Broncos and Packers. In terms of the relationship between Adjusted BS Rate and winning, the top 8 teams are a combined 58-38, while the bottom 8 teams are a combined 31-65. A few other things I'll point out before moving on are
- The Dolphins are #3 in Adjusted BS Rate despite being less than 2 full seasons removed from a 1-15 record. Meanwhile, the Niners are still only #18 despite being in a "rebuilding mode" for the past 6 years. Why isn't the Dolphins record better than 6-6 this season? Looking at the difference between their Adjusted and Unadjusted IR, you see that they've had a governor on their engine called "the toughest IR strength of schedule (SOS) in the NFL."
- The same thing can be said for the other seemingly underachieving team in the top 8: The Atlanta Falcons. Yes, passes by Matt Ryan (and now Chris Redman) have been intercepted rather frequently. However, these INTs have come against the 4th-toughest IR schedule in the league.
- On the flip side, DEN is in the top 8 when it comes to Unadjusted IR, but they're only a middle-of-the-road IR team when we take their 3rd-easiest IR SOS into account. So, in my mind, their 8-4 record is somewhat of a mirage insofar as it's a byproduct of ball security in the passing game.
THE REST OF THE 49ERS' FORMULA STATS
Now that I have a useful stat for measuring Total Ball Security, I can add it to the following table, which displays the Niners stats according to Singletary's Formula for Success, what those stats were last week, and what the extent of change was between this week's stats and last week's stats (top-8 in bold; bottom-8 in italics):
|
|
|
This Week |
|
Last Week |
|
Change |
|||
|
Formula Ingredient |
Statistic |
Value |
Rk |
Value |
Rk |
Value |
Rk |
||
|
Total Ball Security |
Adj BS Rate |
97.55% |
18 |
|
97.53% |
18 |
|
-0.02% |
0 |
|
Total Ball Security |
BS Rate |
97.70% |
17 |
|
97.63% |
19 |
|
-0.07% |
+2 |
|
Total Ball Security |
FR |
2.32% |
22 |
|
2.28% |
21 |
|
-0.04% |
-1 |
|
Total Ball Security |
IR |
2.27% |
10 |
|
2.56% |
13 |
|
+0.29% |
+3 |
|
Total Ball Security |
Adj IR |
2.71% |
11 |
|
2.86% |
17 |
|
+0.15% |
+6 |
|
Execute |
Total |
0.6% |
17 |
-1.6% |
20 |
+1.0% |
+3 |
||
|
Execute |
OFF |
-7.1% |
21 |
|
-10.0% |
21 |
|
+2.9% |
0 |
|
Execute |
DEF |
-7.2% |
5 |
|
-7.6% |
7 |
|
+0.4% |
+2 |
|
Execute |
ST |
0.5% |
16 |
|
0.8% |
15 |
|
+0.3% |
-1 |
|
Execute |
1Q OFF |
-31.9% |
30 |
|
-39.3% |
31 |
|
+7.4% |
+1 |
|
Execute |
1Q DEF |
-6.8% |
11 |
|
-2.7% |
13 |
|
+4.1% |
+2 |
|
Dominate the Trenches |
OL ALY |
3.23 |
32 |
|
3.21 |
32 |
|
+0.02 |
0 |
|
Dominate the Trenches |
OL ASR |
8.6% |
27 |
|
9.3% |
29 |
|
+0.7% |
+2 |
|
Dominate the Trenches |
DF7 ALY |
3.65 |
8 |
|
3.65 |
7 |
|
0.00 |
-1 |
|
Dominate the Trenches |
DF7 ASR |
7.1% |
7 |
|
6.7% |
13 |
|
+0.4% |
+6 |
|
Create Great Field Position |
FG/XP Pts |
1.7 |
14 |
|
1.1 |
15 |
|
+0.6 |
+1 |
|
Create Great Field Position |
KO Pts |
3.9 |
12 |
|
3.2 |
15 |
|
+0.7 |
+3 |
|
Create Great Field Position |
KR Pts |
-1.9 |
17 |
|
-1.9 |
18 |
|
0.0 |
+1 |
|
Create Great Field Position |
P Pts |
12.0 |
2 |
|
11.0 |
2 |
|
+1.0 |
0 |
|
Create Great Field Position |
PR Pts |
-13.5 |
32 |
|
-10.1 |
31 |
|
-3.4 |
-1 |
|
Create Great Field Position |
Own 1-20 OFF |
-32.2% |
30 |
|
-35.2% |
30 |
|
+3.0% |
0 |
|
Create Great Field Position |
Opp 1-20 DEF |
19.5% |
24 |
|
22.2% |
24 |
|
+2.7% |
0 |
|
Finish |
4Q OFF |
6.4% |
16 |
|
3.2% |
18 |
|
+3.2% |
+2 |
|
Finish |
4Q DEF |
4.5% |
15 |
|
2.8% |
14 |
|
-1.7% |
-1 |
|
Finish |
Late/Close OFF |
-24.8% |
28 |
|
-27.7% |
31 |
|
+2.9% |
+3 |
|
Finish |
Late/Close DEF |
-11.0% |
7 |
|
-13.1% |
9 |
|
-2.1% |
+2 |
Aside from the aforementioned improvement in Adjusted IR, the Niners' biggest Formula-related statistical change this week came in defensive front 7 (DF7) ASR: the 49ers' DF7 is now in the top 8 of the NFL when it comes to sacking the QB. I never thought I'd write that sentence; that's for sure.
A few other changes that are interesting...First, every offensive DVOA in this table showed improvement over last week. For reasons that I've repeated numerous times on Niners Nation, the most important offensive improvement -in my mind - is the massive jump in 1st-Quarter DVOA. Hot starts - especially on the road - are what good teams display, so, if this stat continues to improve over the final 4 games, it bodes well for next season.
Second, thanks to the Terrible Twosome of Arnaz Battle and Brandon Jones - not to be confused with the Tainted Twosome of VD and Crabs - the Niners have now lost 13.5 points-worth of field position on punt returns. A lot of fans bemoan the 49ers' awful "return teams," but in actuality it's only the punt return team that's truly awful. The kickoff return unit is below average, for sure, but they've cost the Niners about 12 fewer points-worth of field position than the punt return unit. So when you're complaining about the "return teams," focus your ire on the guys who catch, run, and block when the opponent punts the ball.
Finally, only 1 of the 5 Formula ingredients showed improvement across the board: Execute. That's obviously a good thing.
BOTTOM LINE
Based on Mike Singletary's Formula for Success:
- Total Ball Security - Amazingly, the shotgun OFF has turned Smith into a ball-secure QB. Unfortunately, the Niners as a whole are still mediocre in this ingredient because Frank Gore and Arnaz Battle continue to be ball-insecure 49ers.
- Execute - They're still average, but improving across the board.
- Dominate in the Trenches - They're still average overall, but the DF7 is dominating in pass-rushing situations.
- Create Great Field Position - They're still average. If it weren't for the pathetic punt return unit, they'd be well above average.
- Finish - They're still average, but at least the OFF is catching up to the DEF.
Coming up later today or tomorrow... a very special article about Alex Smith, Shaun Hill, and the shotgun OFF.
*DVOA, ALY, and ASR statistics used to produce this article were obtained from Football Outsiders.
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Comments
Shotgun-Hater Here
I’m not sure you are properly presenting the other sides argument when you say . .
Well, in football, it’s pretty much the conventional wisdom that more passing leads to a higher IR. Likewise, the conventional wisdom among anti-shotgun Niner fans is that more shotgun leads to a higher IR. From this table, we can see that, since SF implemented their shotgun OFF for the first time against GB, their IR has clearly defied the conventional wisdom; it’s actually getting better!
The argument against the shotgun is not that it hurts the passing game, the argument against the shotgun is it has damaging long term effect on the running game. Once the run game degrades to a point where it’s no longer a concern or even functional the offense has two serious problems: cannot run the ball when they need to run the ball and defenses can ignore the run threat and put more resources into stopping the pass.
In other words a shotgun offense creates am unsustainable bubble which will eventually deflate or pop. Right now you are reporting the inflation of the bubble but ignoring other concerning indicators. If you really want to make a credible argument for the shotgun offense (Run n’ Shoot, Spread . . . whatever you want to call it) than you have to attack the detractors actual key points.
A) The run game eventually degrades over time.
B) Red zone offense efficiency decreases because the offense cannot spread the defense near the end zone.
C) The passing game over time hits a plateau and starts to be consistently less efficient.
D) Without the ability to control the football and clock on offense the defense degrades over time due to excessive snaps, fatigue and exposure.
Prove there is not a bubble than you have silenced the detractors argument. Right now the run game is degrading, the red zone efficiency is decreasing and according to Cardinal and Seahawk interviews defenses are still planning for a 49ers run based offense.
I think the run game was pretty bad to begin with. I’m wondering, though, if when you talk about shotgun making the running game worse, how do you mean it? If it has to do with fewer runs being run, Danny made a pretty compelling case that running ability is more important than running frequency when previously addressing the issue of the shotgun and the run game.
I don't know about that, to the groin.
by howtheyscored on Dec 11, 2009 1:09 PM PST up reply actions
Here is my answer
I’m wondering, though, if when you talk about shotgun making the running game worse, how do you mean it?
Well, the team makes run plays obvious when they aren’t in a shotgun formation. We’ve already witnessed plenty evidence and causes for concern. Although, Raye tips his hand more with the FB on the field instead of the QB’s formation. This why the team needs to push Alex to be an effective passer under center on 1st and 2nd down. Alex’s formation position on 3rd and long is really a moot point, the defense knows its a pass.
Also, you can only run so many draws, which is a trick play, before the defense catches on. After awhile that play isn’t going to be a surprise and is going to be less effective. For evidence see all of Jim Hostler’s 3rd down draw plays in 2007. The problem with the shotgun formation is the draw is the most frequent run option. Unless the 49ers want to go all shotgun on passing downs and all wildcat on running downs.
Finally the number of run plays is limited in a shotgun based offense. If one team is running the ball 25 times per game and another team is running the ball 12 times per game than who would you imagine has improved their running game by the end of a 16 game season? You’d expect the team with more experience and reps to show greater improvement.
All three of these factors combine to damage the the run game.
Even though the 49ers are awful running the ball, the solution is not to abandon the running game. The solution is to get better, which means keep trying instead of of the proposed solution of not trying.
how does...
….a defense “catch on” to the draw? if the formation looks the same, and there’s no clear tendency to run the draw in a given situation, why is it necessarily the case that the defense will catch on to the draw? are they mindreaders or something?
a perfect counterexample is the fact that the niners’ DEF has been getting killed on screens all season. it’s 12 games in now, and they don’t seem to have “caught on.” why? because, when it’s disguised correctly, the defense can’t know the screen is coming. that’s the beauty of the screen.
so there’s no 100% certainty — or probably anything near it — that defenses will “catch on” and start stopping the draw just because the niners starting using the draw play more.
by (Florida) Danny Tuccitto on Dec 11, 2009 1:43 PM PST up reply actions
On a disguised screen the defensive linemen have taken themselves out of the play and the offensive linemen are free to lay hats the linebackers and secondary.
On a draw the offensive line still has to block the defensive line and the success of the run play depends on the initial drop back of the linebackers. If the linebackers simply take a shorter initial drop they are in better position to get the running back. It’s a slight adjustment and a play that gives a defense time to recover even if fooled, unlike a screen.
right...
so the effectiveness of the draw has to do with the continued ability of the OL to block the defensive line if the linebackers continue to drop back. when smith is in shotgun, why would the LBs figure out when to drop back and when to not drop back if the niners are throwing the ball the vast majority of the time from shotgun, and continue to effectively disguise the draw?
i get what you’re saying about how a defense properly defends the draw. but, i don’t think it addresses why defenses would know all of a sudden that the “draw defense” is what they need to implement on a given play if the formation looks the same and the niners’ tendency while in shotgun is to pass an overwhelming percentage of the time.
by (Florida) Danny Tuccitto on Dec 11, 2009 1:58 PM PST up reply actions
The defense is conceding a short LB drop to the offense but this might only affect one LB when the defense is already in a shell, nickle or dime coverage. You’d have to assume this would be the base defense against a pass heavy, shotgun, spread offense. It opens up a bit of passing hole on the defense but probably not one the offense can exploit consistently enough and unlikely a short 7 yard pass to the middle of the field is going to result into a huge gain.
Yep
If the D was to truly “catch on”, we might as well run the play without an O line! I’m just saying it just comes down to how well a play is executed.
That said, I do feel the Niners need to seriously consider running the ball more even though it’s out of spread-like/shotgun formation. They need to keep these defenses on their toes. If they can even pull off just a handful of good runs (I know they can, we’ve seen it happen), it will hopefully influence the D to play more guys up in the box. That’s when they will have a chance to truly spread the field and play this formation to it’s fullest potential.
Also, about execution, why don’t the Niners just simply play every down with the mindset that every down is “3rd down”? I haven’t picked their drives apart with a fine-toothed comb, but if they play 1st down with the mentality (conscious or unconscious) of “we have three plays to do this”, 2nd down with “ok we still have two plays to do this” and then 3rd down comes, the “un-clutch” (sorry but I have to be honest) teams more than often seem to go into a bit of a panic mode. I just think they would have better potential of success if everyone involved in the offense calls plays and executes like no down is necessarily different from another. After all the overall objective to get the ball downfield and score points is the same no matter what down it is.
this is all well and good...
except for the fact that i’ve shown week after week that the running game has gotten more efficient since alex smith came in, and they started using more shotgun.
at this point, there’s absolutely no statistical evidence that the shotgun has hurt their offense in any meaningful way. since this little experiment began, this is all that’s happened statistically.
a) their run offense is more efficient
b) their pass offense is more effecient
b) their sacks allowed rate is waaaaaaaaaaaaaaay lower
c) their interception rate is waaaaaaaaaaaay lower
i mean, i don’t really understand what’s being argued here. it’s nice to have the opinion of this or that about the shotgun. maybe with other teams the shotgun might not work, and some of the arguments against it might be vindicated, but with this team, the evidence is pretty clear. everything i predicted it would do, back when i was calling for it 6 weeks ago, it has done. the OL is playing better. the OFF is clearly more able to move the ball. alex smith looks like an entirely different QB.
please…provide me with any evidence whatsoever that the 2009 49ers have been hurt in any way by using more shotgun. i’d love to hear it.
by (Florida) Danny Tuccitto on Dec 11, 2009 1:38 PM PST up reply actions
I’m saying just wait and see. It’s a bubble, looks good now but will hurt later on once the defenses catch up. Problem with the offense is once the defense catches up, their isn’t an offensive counter like what is built into a more traditional offense.
well...
you could be right about a bubble. i mean, anything can happen. all i really care about is the fact that the niners’ OFF is clearly better since they’ve gone to more shotgun, and that, even if your hypothetical bubble bursts, they’re not going to ever be as bad as they were before. given the personnel on the field, the shotgun OFF is the right thing to do, and it has clearly worked. if DEF’s catch up, then the offensive coaches will just have to cross that bridge when they come to it.
by (Florida) Danny Tuccitto on Dec 11, 2009 2:01 PM PST up reply actions
The problem with this argument...
…is that it’s never accompanied by systematic empirical proof. You may be right, you may be wrong, but there’s only one way to know for sure. And thus far, advocates of the diminishing returns argument have offered only selective stats culled from miniscule samples. It’s the flip side of your point — which is well taken — that we can’t judge the effectiveness of passing from shotgun all the time based on the Pats and Colts.
However,
the Pats and Colts show that “passing from the shotgun all the time will lead to bad production from the pass and run games” is patently false.
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The Colts having only gotten into shotgun heavily this season where in the past they preferred to throw under center with play action.
The Patriots didn’t switch to a full shotgun again until 2007. Ok, the Pats tried this 2002, started off hot with a great offense, fizzled and failed to make the playoffs. Yet, this is where providing empirical evidence gets sticky. Cannot compare 2008 stats because of No Brady. Can compare 2009 stats because it’s mostly the same key players but their is suitable argument the issue is age.
The only team that seems to defy the bubble was the 99-01 Rams. However, when an offense has at least 4 HOF players with possibly 5, it’s going to be hard to stop them no matter what offense they choose to run.
Still I look at the 49ers talent level and they are more comparable to the Houston Oilers, 90’s Lions and early 90’s Falcons. Wildcard appearance and mostly fizzle.
Too strong...
…because they could be outliers, no? For example, we know the West Coast offense is generally efficient because other teams have implemented it successfully. But until it was, one might reasonably have wondered if the Niners’ success was a product of incredible talent — i.e., an exception to the rule. Similarly the shotgun spread hasn’t been widely implemented with success at the pro level. The best evidence is college football, and it’s unclear how that translates to the pros.
My theory on the success of the spread in college football mainly rests on 2 observations:
a) College football schedules are a complete joke. A high powered program might play 4 competitive games a given season compared to an NFL team where almost all their games are competitive. This Law of Diminishing returns isn’t going to kick in if the offense isn’t being tested often. Their isn’t much tape being built for a DC to study and effectively counter an offense.
b) The talent level of a college football defense is pathetic. A single great athlete like Michael Vick can run all over a college football defense. However, in the Pro’s he’s going against a defense filled with players that are just as much athletic freaks as he is. A spread offense puts the ball in the hands of your great player more often than a pro style offense. Pro style offenses are built for more distribution.
I think the Spread is a very good college offense because essentially it allows teams to blitzkrieg an opponent, plus the season doesn’t allow defenses to catch up.
The spread is not the same thing as the shotgun.
Yes Drew K, Tim Tebow will get picked in the first round.
All totally valid points...
…but I’d still love to see more NFL teams actually test that theory. The culture of pro football is so conservative that coaches are sometimes inefficiently over-deterred from innovating even where it makes sense. The Colts and Pats’ success with the shotgun suggests it MAY be possible. I suspect we might see some counter-intuitive results if more teams followed their lead.
I don't credit the shotgun
But I do credit the increase in pass attempts. Smith, with his current receiving options, will likely throw the same number of INTs in a game whether he has 25 attempts or 40 attempts, as long as he’s not playing from behind and thus more likely to force a pass when the defense is expecting it.
You gotta bring ass to get ass.
? que ?
The shotgun or the “raye gun” is clearly the best way to currently utilize our personnel. There is really no way to argue against it. Not only do the stats back it up, but the experience of watching the offense out of the shotgun is much more promising. In other words, when I see Smith taking a snap from center, I start biting my fingernails and my heart rate goes up 25%.
And your statement about Smith forcing passes when “the defense is expecting it” is exactly opposite of the situation for which most criticized him in being successful for.
I was responding to the poll question
I credit the statistical drop in offensive INT rate to Smith having more pass attempts regardless of whether he is under center or shotgun. Both TDs vs Seattle came while under center. Most of our lack of success on 3rd down came from shotgun. So the improvement in this stat is about pass attempts not where Smith receives the snap.
You gotta bring ass to get ass.
I credit it to...
Smith being more comfortable in the offense. Could that be attributed to the shotgun? Sure, but not deinitely. Maiocco said the TD passes to Morgan and VD last week came from running formations.
by Smithisstilltheanswer on Dec 12, 2009 6:31 AM PST up reply actions
I credit the shotgun and the more pass-happy offense as a result.
Smith seems to be far more comfortable in the shotgun because it seems to be easier for him to go through his reads. Plus with the kind of season Davis is having, it leaves weapons like Crabtree and Morgan in single coverage and it takes a LOT of pressure off Frank Gore too.
by rise_stand_resist on Dec 11, 2009 4:02 PM PST reply actions
Shotgun and Glen Coffee
I know the wrap is that he is the same kind of runner, but why the hell not get coffee more reps in the shotgun. If he misses some protection, then sit him back down. At this point in the season I see no reason not to get more reps out of Coffee. Maybe he has an instinct in this offense? Who knows?
Any thoughts?
Agreed
I LOVE Frank Gore but he just isn’t seeing the holes while running from the ‘gun. Maybe Coffee runs better with this offense, who knows? But it sure wouldn’t hurt to give him a few looks on game day.
by Smithisstilltheanswer on Dec 12, 2009 6:32 AM PST up reply actions

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