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Book: Glenn Dickey's 49ers

so I just happened across a copy of the book, Glenn Dickey's 49ers - The Rise, Fall, and ReBirth of the NFL's Greatest Dynasty published in 2000.

I've begun reading it and just wondered if anyone else here has read it before.  What did you think?  Also I'll use this thread to post occasional comments or particularly interesting quotes from the book as I go through it.  I've really enjoyed reading howtheyscored's Year-by-Year posts, so I figured I might as well work on boning up on as much Niner and NFL history knowledge as possible.  Can never seem to get tired of it.

So here's a few beginning quotes -

On General Manager Joe Thomas (who we can thank Al Davis for - he recommended him to then new owner Eddie DeBartolo) who led the 49ers to a 7-23 record from 77-79 -

"[Coach Monte] Clark remembered one telling incident about Thomas at Miami.  The coaches were discussing an upcoming draft and they thought they'd play a joke on Thomas, putting a totally bogus name up on the draft board.  When Thomas saw the name, instead of asking who the player was, he pretended to know, giving the fictional player different attributes ...

In San Francisco, he would hire only coaches who were subservient, and his owner was more than 2,000 miles away.  He had total control and, with that control, he turned a team that was on the verge of making the playoffs into one that was the worst in the league, no better than an expansion team.

His player judgment seemed to desert him.  He released Jim Plunkett, who had come to the 49ers in a costly trade worked out before Clark joined the team; the Raiders picked up Plunkett off the waiver wire, and he later led them to two Super Bowl triumphs.  Thomas gave up five draft picks over a three year period, including his No. 1 in 1979, for O.J. Simpson, whose knee injuries had robbed him of his great ability. ...

Because players knew Thomas had all the authority - he even dictated who should start from week to week - they had no respect for their coaches.  Thomas desperately made player changes, on the roster and in the starting lineup, but nothing worked.  The 49ers got worse and worse, falling from 8-6 in Clark's last year to 5-9 in Thomas's first season.  In 1978, the NFL season was expanded to 16 games, which gave the 49ers a chance to set a franchise record for most loses, with a 2-14 mark.  The frantic Thomas lectured players in the locker room after virtually every loss ...

[Thomas] changed all the locks and put up bars on the windows at 49ers headquarters, and he threw away pictures and souvenirs of anything that had existed before he came on the scene, including the '10-year club' plaque on the dressing room wall, with honoured players who had spent at least 10 years with the 49ers ...

Most fans weren't aware of everything Thomas was doing behind the scenes, but they certainly knew who was responsible for the team's decline.  At every home game, fans put up signs reading, 'Blame Joe Thomas' and 'Thomas Must Go.'  Thomas instructed stadium security men to destroy the signs ...

The barrage of criticism from media and fans along with the realization that the team was getting worse and worse, made Thomas paranoid.  When San Francisco mayor George Moscone was assassinated on November 27, 1978, Thomas became convinced that somebody would try to shoot him as well, at the game scheduled that night at Candlestick Park, and he wanted the game canceled.  The game was played and nobody shot at Thomas.  And, of course, the 49ers lost, 24-7 to the Pittsburgh Steelers ...

After a 49er loss to the St. Louis Cardinals, he charged into the dressing room and told players, 'If I'm going down the tubes, I'm going to take you with me.'

On the dawn of a new era -

Eddie fired Thomas ... As soon as Eddie fired Thomas, he called Walsh to set up a meeting ... Before [Carmen] Policy left Youngstown for the meeting, he had been called into the office of Ed DeBartolo, Sr. 'I want you to watch Eddie to make sure he doesn't offer this coach too much money,' the senior DeBartolo told Policy. 'Don't let him go over $120,000.'

But Eddie had made up his mind before the meeting was held.  After Walsh had talked with DeBartolo and Policy about his plans for the team, Eddie asked him how much salary he wanted.  Walsh said $160,000, more than triple his Stanford salary, never dreaming he'd get that much.  'You've got it,' said Eddie ...

This is a FanPost and does not necessarily reflect the views of Niners Nation's writers or editors. It does reflect the views of this particular fan though, which is as important as the views of Niners Nation's writers or editors.

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wow. great story

by redrum21225 on May 8, 2009 1:57 PM PDT reply actions   0 recs

yeah, so far I’m really enjoying Dickey’s storytelling ability

"Those boos really motivate me to make something happen." - Bonds

by Persiflage on May 8, 2009 2:18 PM PDT up reply actions   0 recs

I've been reading some more ...

On the 1979 NFL Draft –

"When Walsh first started looking at the draft, though, the quarterback he really liked was Phil Simms. But because the 49ers had no first-round pick (gone in the O.J. Simpson trade), he knew he didn’t have a shot at Simms, who would go to the New York Giants on the first round. So, he had to look elsewhere for a quarterback.

He went on a nationwide search, trying out every quarterback who was considered a top prospect. One result of the search was that he found a wide receiver. At Clemson to work out Steve Fuller, he asked Dwight Clark to catch Fuller’s passes. Walsh was not impressed with Fuller, but he had always liked big receivers and he was pleasantly surprised by Clark, who had not even been listed among the top 50 receivers in scouting reports. He would draft Clark on the 10th round, and Clark would set pass-receiving records for the 49ers.

Montana was the last on the list, but Walsh had been intrigued by what he knew of Joe’s collegiate career. At times, Montana had been benched by Notre Dame coach Dan Devine for his inconsistent play, but he had also shown moments of brilliance, most notably in the Cotton Bowl in his senior year, when he brough his team back from a 34-12 fourth-quarter deficit to a 35-34 win over Houston …

[Walsh] preferred quarterbacks who were quick-footed enough to elude the pass rush and make plays when the normal play had broken down. ‘You could see his ability right away,’ Walsh told me years later. ’It’s so important that a quarterback be able to get back quickly and set up, and then be able to improvise if the play breaks down. I sensed just watching Joe in that workout that he’d be able to do that in time, though he surprised me by how quickly he learned everything.’

Walsh always had his own criteria for judging players, especially quarterbacks. Montana was downgraded by most NFL scouts and coaches because of his inconsistent college career and because they thought he lacked the arm strength to be a successful NFL quarterback. But Walsh’s system emphasized accuracy, not arm strength, and he was confident that he could make Montana a consistent performer … Because Montana was not highly regarded by others, Walsh felt he could wait to draft him. When Brodie heard on the radio that the 49ers had gone first for [RB James] Owens, he called 49er headquarters to ask Walsh why he hadn’t taken Montana. Walsh reassured him with information he had obtained from his contacts in the league: that no team thought of Montana as higher than a fifth- or sixth-round pick …

Montana was certainly fortunate to come to the 49ers at that particular moment, to a coach who appreciated his ability and had the system to use it. His career would have been quite different if he had gone to another team, especially if it had been as a sixth-round pick. If he had gone to a team whose coach thought his quarterback should have a cannon for an arm, he probably would have been cut in training camp.

Quarterback evaluations are really that quixotic in the NFL. Jim Plunkett was cut by the 49ers and went on to win two Super Bowls for the Raiders. Johnny Unitas was playing semipro ball and was signed by the Baltimore Colts only because of an injury to starter George Shaw. As recently as the 1999 season, Kurt Warner was put on the expansion draft list for the Rams, the Cleveland Browns didn’t take him, and so he was there when Trent Green was injured and knocked out for the season …

Walsh also picked his spots very carefully with Montana, using him only in specific situations in his rookie season, a tactic that gave Montana the chance to look good and build up his confidence as well as the team’s confidence in him. He would usually put in Montana only when the 49ers were inside their opponent’s 20, for instance, and he would call a play, usually a rollout, on which Montana had just one receiver. The receiver would usually be open, but if he wasn’t, Montana could run. In either case, the chance that Montana might throw an interception, which would have been devastating both to him and the team, was reduced to almost zero. And, in fact, he threw 23 passes that rookie season, but no interceptions.

Walsh used subterfuge to disguise his plans early in Montana’s second season. Before the third game of the season, Steve DeBerg developed laryngitis, and the 49ers equipped him with a voice-amplifier so he could call signals in the game. When the 49ers reached the Jets 10 early in the game, DeBerg pointed to the voice box, indicating he was having problems, and came out of the game. Montana came in and ran a bootleg for a touchdown. There was nothing wrong with DeBerg’s voice box; the whole procedure had been planned before the game by Walsh, who reasoned that the Jets would be caught off base by it. ‘It shouldn’t have taken a rocket scientist to realize Joe was going to run a bootleg,’ said guard Randy Cross, ‘but the Jets couldn’t figure it out.’"
________________________________________

Thoughts –

First of all, I’m loving the book so far. I’ve just given you guys 2 out of the first 50 pages or so, but there’s a lot of good stuff here I didn’t know before. I was pretty young during the Montana years (although I remember watching most of the games).

Second, I think there’s some important things to think about here when drafting QBs -

1 – according to Walsh, arm strength is overrated – accuracy beats arm strength any day
2 – according to Walsh, NFL potential is more important than consistently good college production – it’s the skill and ability that the player should be learning and gaining in college, not record setting college season (AHHAlex Hem Cousmithgh)
3 – drafting a first round QB is not always the best way to go, particularly when that QB is ranked so high for his arm strength & college numbers
4 – slowly … slooowlllllly developing your young QBs, letting them learn, build confidence and rapport with the team, allowing them to make big plays when scoring should be easy, instead of just starting them immediately – that’s a much safer way of getting a good QB, instead of actively ensuring yourself a draft bust

All this makes me think twice about all this hype about Tebow. You know he’s going to be overrated in the draft. QBs always are.

"Those boos really motivate me to make something happen." - Bonds

by Persiflage on May 9, 2009 7:26 PM PDT reply actions   0 recs

on Fred Dean ...

"the acquisition of Fred Dean … gave the 49ers an awesome pass rusher …

Dean was originally a second-round draft pick of the San Diego Chargers, who took advantage of Dean and his inexperienced agent and signed him to an eight-year contract, with only minimal raises from year to year. He quickly became a Pro Bowl player and tried to renegotiate his contract, but the Chargers would not agree. So, he refused to report. The Chargers had no choice but to trade him, and the 49ers got him.

Dean was an incredible physical package, with great quickness and an unbelievably strong upper body for a man who weighed only 228 pounds, not much for a defensive lineman. It was natural strength, derived from manual labor in his youth, not work in the weight room. ‘Whenever I feel like exercising,’ he said, ‘I lie down until the feeling goes away.’ While other players lifted weights, he sat on the stool in front of his locker, puffing on a cigarette. That bizarre training regime worked for Dean, who could dart around offensive linemen before they could solidly block him or who could throw a lineman to the side to clear his path. ‘I feel I can get to the quarterback any time I want,’ he said.

"Those boos really motivate me to make something happen." - Bonds

by Persiflage on May 9, 2009 9:35 PM PDT reply actions   0 recs

a few quotes on the '88 season ...

Despite the extra protection, Montana had taken a beating in the game. Physically, he was a mess. He’d injured his elbow, his back was a continual problem, and he’d lost weight he couldn’t afford to lose in a bout with dystentery. Walsh decided to give more playing time to Young for the next game, perhaps even start him …

Reporters provoked Montana by exaggerating Walsh’s statement to make it seem Young was replacing him – though Walsh had explicitly said that Montana was still the starter, not matter how much Young played in the Minnesota game – and Joe responded with a strong defense of his play. That forced a meeting between the two that was uncomfortable for both. Walsh tried to soothe Montana’s feelings by saying he just wanted Joe to get healthy for the stretch run. Montana wasn’t placated; he was still certain Walsh was trying to replace him. Then, as he started to get up from his chair to leave, his back went into spasms. Dr. Michael Dillingham, the team doctor, told Montana to stay out of practice; 48 hours later, Dr. Dillingham ruled him out of the game …

Young’s play in the Vikings game was a microcosm of his 49er career to that date. He was hyperactive in the first half, and the result was an inconsistent 49er offense that could score only three points, on a Mike Cofer field goal. Young started the second half, though, by directing a 97-yard touchdown drive and then connected with John Taylor on a 73-yard touchdown pass. The Vikings matched those touchdowns with two of their own and led, 21-17, with just over two minutes to go. Then Young made a brilliant play that would have been inconceivable for any other quarterback in the game; and, typically for his early 49er career, he made it with his feet. Back to pass from the Minnesota 49, he seemed about to be sacked as he disappeared momentarily under the Vikings pass rushers. Then he somehow burst free from the pack and started running to his left. He faked a pass and then headed downfield, breaking through tackles from what seemed like every Minnesota defender, and he finally flopped across the goal line, totally spent, for the touchdown that won the game.
______________________________________________

And then back with Montana …

When the 49ers went into Chicago for the NFC championship game, the local media believed the only question was the Bears’ victory margin. The 49er offense couldn’t match the Bears’ defense, especially in the bitter cold of a Chicago winter. The Bears were a very strong team, though not quite so dominant as the 1985 championship team. Defensive coordinator Buddy Ryan had installed a pressure defense that would be adopted (though not so successfully) by many other teams, just as other teams had copied Walsh’s offense. The defense, nicknamed the “46 defense” because that was the uniform number for middle linebacker Mike Singletary, put eight defenders on the line of scrimmage before every snap. At the snap, some defenders would drop back into pass coverage, but the offense never knew which players would rush and which would drop back – or whether all eight of them would go for the quarterback, as happened fairly frequently. The Bears consistently disrupted offenses, which couldn’t get into a rhythm.
Walsh had learned his lesson from the regular season game, and he was determined to run his offense, with as many as five possible receivers for Montana’s passes. The weather conditions even helped; on a first-quarter play, Jerry Rice took a short pass from Montana and ran past Chicago defenders, who slipped on the icy field, for 61 yards and a touchdown. The 49ers rolled up 406 yards in total offense in a surprisingly easy 28-3 win …
______________________________________________

later on the early 1991 season -

Young’s agent, Leigh Steinberg, had advised him to ask the 49ers to trade him because Young could have started for almost any other team in the NFL … When he played, he played well enough to be the starter, but the 49ers would have been crazy to bench Montana when he was playing at such a high level.

Steinberg was also concerned about what would happen when Young finally got his chance to play because the expectations for Montana’s successor would be impossibly high. Such expectations had doomed Danny White when he replaced Roger Staubach with the Dallas Cowboys and Mark Malone when he followed Terry Bradshaw with the Pittsburgh Steelers.

Young resisted Steinberg’s advice, and he welcomed the challenge of following Montana. "There were times watching Joe when I just said, ‘Wow, that set a standard for me,’ said Young. “Left to yourself, you might not set the bar so high, but when you see it right in front of you, you know you have to play that way. And I wanted to do it as a 49er. This was my team.”

"Those boos really motivate me to make something happen." - Bonds

by Persiflage on May 11, 2009 6:09 PM PDT reply actions   0 recs

For the sake of accuracy

Glenn Dickey makes a lot of mistakes regarding the Bears game in 1988.

1. The 46 defense was named after safety Doug Plank, not Mike Singletary.

2. Buddy Ryan wasn’t the DC. He had left Chicago immediately after the Super Bowl victory of the 85 Bears. Ryan had been in Philadelphia for three years by the time this particular game was played.

After Ryan left in 1986, Ditka replaced him with Vince Tobin, whose brother Bill was the director of player personnel for the Chicago Bears. Vince Tobin ran a read and react, passive scheme. Almost completely opposite from Ryan’s pressure defense. They did still use some of the 46, but for the most part the scheme under Vince Tobin was completely different. Due to Mike Ditka’s jealousy of Buddy Ryan, he tried to distance the Bears from using Buddy’s scheme. Ditka even refused to allow it to be called the ‘46 defense,’ instead referring to it as the ‘Bear defense.’

The players hated it. And despite their regular season success, they weren’t able to dominate in the playoffs like they had under Buddy Ryan. When you get into the playoffs playing top notch teams, your weaknesses will usually reveal themselves. Mike Ditka’s playoff record, after Ryan left was only 2 – 5.
 
3. As far as the actual scheme, Dickey is pretty much mistaken there also. The base 46 lined up six players on the line (two DE’s, two DT’s and two OLB’s), and not eight. Sometimes one or more of those players would drop back into coverage. And often, others (MLB, safety or cornerback) would blitz, giving the Bears six, seven or eight players rushing the QB.

As a general rule there would be eight players ‘in the box’ but not usually on the line of scrimmage.

by GeoMak on May 11, 2009 10:16 PM PDT up reply actions   0 recs

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