AUTHOR'S NOTE: I haven't posted in over a month, and we have a fair amount of newcomers to Niners Nation, so I figure a quick (re)introduction is in order. As you can see, my name's Danny. I'm currently getting my PhD in sport psychology at the University of Florida (but actually reside in Fort Lauderdale, FL...don't ask). I've been a 49er fan since the team's Super Bowl XIX victory over the hometown Dolphins on my 7^th birthday in 1985. My job title on Niners Nation is "Resident Stats Nerd" or something to that effect. During the season, I do a statistical preview and review of each 49ers' game. In addition to these game-specific posts, I also write up general stat-based articles on 49er-related news of the moment. You can find my previous posts here. Hopefully, you enjoy reading my articles, or, at the very least, learn something 49er-related from them. Two warnings, though: (1) My articles tend to be on the longish side; and (2) I fully realize that stats can only go so far in explaining and predicting football performance. If you don't like what the stats seem to suggest, feel free to ignore them. Oh, and one last thing...I mostly rely on defense-adjusted value over average (DVOA) and other alternative statistics developed by Football Outsiders (FO) because they're the best measures of NFL performance currently available to the public. For an explanation of FO's stats, see here.

For the second time in 3 years, there's a good bit of optimism surrounding our beloved 49ers (not here, of course). Many fans (including this one) feel a real sense that 2009 will be the season that ends SF's 6-year playoff drought. The reasons for such optimism are numerous. First, there's the whole, "they finally have a competent head coach" thing. Second, there's the fact that they finally have a real WR corps (thank you Al Davis). Third, they actually seem to be - gasp - tailoring their offensive and defensive schemes around the players' strengths and weaknesses. Fourth, rather than just putting up a words-not-deeds-style banner, they've actually enumerated a "Formula for Success" that tells players and fans exactly how the team plans to "Win the West."

So the 49ers' goal this upcoming season - in the minds of players, coaches, and fans alike - is to make the playoffs.  As ARI showed last season - and as PIT showed in 2005 - anything can happen once a team gets in the postseason tourney. In this article, I'm going to address the general question, "Is our optimism justified from a statistical perspective?" More specifically, I'm going to look at the major statistical characteristics of teams that make the quantum leap into playoff participation from one season to the next, and evaluate whether or not the 2009 49ers appear to fit the profile.

After the jump, I'll try to stay optimistic...

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AUTHOR' S NOTE: When I discuss QBs in this article, it's just for the sake of argument. What I'm mainly trying to show here is what picks the 49ers will be most able to acquire by packaging their two #1's in 2010 if they choose to do so. Don't get hung up on the QB thing. This stuff can be applied to trading up for any player, not just a QB.

As we all know by now, the 49ers traded their 2^nd- and 4^th-round picks this past weekend for the Panthers'1^st-round pick in next year's draft. The reaction on Niners Nation has definitely been mixed. However, I don't want to get into that argument here. Rather, I'm going to suspend disbelief, and accept Scot McCloughan's reasons for making the deal. One of these reasons is of particular interest to me, and can be found in McCloughan's own words:

As everybody is well aware, ones are huge, especially, if we want to do anything with that pick anytime here out to next year, which of course, going into next draft with two #1 picks.

Grammatical errors aside, one "anything" that McCloughan is likely to want to do with those two #1 picks next year is to package them for a higher (lower?) #1. For the sake of argument, let's assume that the reason to make such a deal is because the 2010 QB draft class looks to be a good one. Below are the top 5 (or 6) QBs in next year's draft according to various "draft gurus" (they're in alphabetical, not rank, order; a * indicates a 2009 junior):

As of right now, it would appear that Bradford and McCoy are the most likely QBs to be selected in the early part of Round 1. This is obviously debatable, so let me repeat that I'm just in "for the sake of argument" mode here. Therefore, if we assume that a good part of the 49ers' increased flexibility is to move up in 2010 for either Bradford or McCoy, the question becomes, "How low (high?) can they go?" Furthermore, "What are the odds that the 49ers can go as low (high?) as possible?"

On Saturday, I briefly addressed these questions in the comments section of Fooch's post detailing the trade. Today, I'm going to go into it much more thoroughly from a statistical probability perspective. Basically, I'm going to provide and discuss the following information:

1. The pick that an NFL team is most likely to have given its record
2. For each combination of SF and CAR team records in 2009, the lowest (highest?) possible 2010 pick the 49ers can acquire if they choose to package their two #1s
3. The odds against SF being able to acquire any single 2010 pick by packaging their two #1s
4. The odds against SF being able to obtain a top 2 or top 5 pick by packaging their two #1s
5. The odds against SF being able to obtain any single, top 2, or top 5 pick given reasonable assumptions about SF's and CAR's 2009 records

After the jump, I'll drop some probability knowledge...

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Hey everyone...just a quick post here before the draft gets started...

We have our own resident draft guru here on NN. His name is briandean. Fooch doesn't pay him anything to drop knowledge on Niners Nation; and that's too bad. It's too bad because ESPN now has two resident draft gurus, Mel Kiper, Jr., and Todd McShay, and they're getting paid a lot of money. Funny thing is...I bet anyone 10-1 on their money that the difference in mock draft accuracy between briandean and the ESPN guys isn't going to even come close to approaching the difference in level of paid compensation. In fact, I'll go ahead and predict right now that briandean's 1^st-round mock accuracy is going to be within 6 correct picks of Mel or Todd's.¹ Here's the simple truth about why:

Kiper and McShay aren't much better than Bonzo the Idiot Monkey.

In true me form, I did a little calculation to get to the bottom of this...

If someone - anyone - was to mock the 1^st round only knowing the names of the 32 players that will be selected, the odds against that person picking 7 or more correctly - simply by dumb luck - are about 20,000 to 1. To put that in perspective, it's the same chance you have of penciling in a (legitimate) 1 one your golf scorecard after any given hole.

Of course, Mel and Todd are getting paid big bucks to know more than just the names of the 32 players. Mel, for example, claims to spend 24 hours a day for 361 days per year - he says he takes 4 days off - gathering information to increase his draft knowledge base. In contrast, Dumb Luck spends exactly 0 hours a day gathering draft knowledge. So the question really is, "If Fooch were to feel generous and pay Dumb Luck $1/yr for mocking the 1^st round each draft, is ESPN getting its money's worth with Mel and Todd?" Well, the answer is obviously no because - and I'm going out on a limb here - Mel and Todd's salaries are way higher than $20,000/yr. In other words, the pick accuracy benefit doesn't even come close to outweighing the "draft guru" cost.

And if you think evaluating Kiper and McShay based on exact picks is a little too harsh, take a look at the gold standard of mock draft evaluation: The Huddle Report's Mock Draft Scores. As their scores show, Mel was tied for 29^th, and Todd was tied for 59^th, among the 94 big-time mock drafters in 2008. And their rankings among 47 mock drafters based on average scores from 2006-2008? Kiper 9^th and McShay 22^nd. Incidentally, Mike Mayock was tied for 75^th in 2008, and is 13^th-best over the past 3 drafts.

So, when you watch the draft today, whether on ESPN or NFL Network, keep in mind that the guys who spend all year researching this stuff are - dollar-for-dollar - not much better at actually, you know, predicting picks than Dumb Luck and Bonzo the Idiot Monkey.

¹ Just in case you were wondering, here's a table showing the odds against Dumb Luck getting a given number of picks (or more) right provided he knows the names of the 32 1^st-rounders:

So, what, you figure that Mel and Todd make somewhere in the neighborhood of $2M/yr in ESPN salary, right? If that's true, then, based on these odds, Mel needs to outpick Dumb Luck 9-1 in order to give ESPN their money's worth; 10-1 and Mel needs his agent to renegotiate that contract, stat!

Back in October, I introduced the Lewin Career Forecast (LCF) to Niners Nation (NN). To put it mildly, the post stirred up some lively debate, and signaled the beginning of a still-raging internecine battle on NN over the appropriateness of football stat analysis. Just to refresh everyone's memory, the LCF, which was developed by David Lewin of Football Outsiders (FO), predicts a QB's NFL performance based on 2 of his college stats: games started (GS) and completion percentage (COMP%). A couple of other ancillary features of the LCF are that (a) it's most appropriate for predicting the NFL performance of 1^st- and 2^nd-round QB picks, and (b) 37 college GS and a 60% college COMP% are the implied statistical benchmarks for success.

Because of its (over)simplicity, the LCF has received a healthy amount of criticism since it was unveiled in Pro Football Prospectus (PFP) 2006. Whether we're talking about statistical modeling or plain ol' common sense, it just can't be right that predicting performance for an NFL QB only requires knowing 2 things about him (3 if you count his draft round). In other words, QB performance is way too complicated to be that simple. Well, at least that's what the critics say. There are other arguments against the LCF, but I'll get into those a little later.

So, I figured that, because the draft is tomorrow, and because the "QB at #10" rumors seem to be accelerating, now would be as good a time as any for me to revisit the LCF and evaluate - from a statistical perspective - just how useful it is to the average NFL fan (Warning: Just because I'm a stats guy, don't assume I'm going to conclude that LCF is über-useful). Therefore, in this article, I'm going to do 4 things:

1. Discuss the statistical and non-statistical positives and negatives of the LCF
2. Give a statistical rationale for a solution that addresses the negatives
3. Detail my solution
4. Apply my solution to the top QB prospects in the 2009 NFL Draft

After the jump, I'll tackle the LCF...

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In Part 3 of this series, I compared the 49ers' overall draft strategy in the Salary Cap Era to that of the Patriots. Obviously, the problem with my analysis in Part 3 is the same one we encountered in Part 1. Namely, evaluating 15 years worth of picks, whether for SF or NE, and comparing two teams with respect to those picks, is akin to putting apples and oranges (i.e., different regimes and team contexts) into one basket and then comparing that basket to one containing bananas and grapes. So Part 3, in reality, was just a way of uncovering general differences between the Niners and Patriots that might explain their overall differences in winning percentage and playoff success.

The better analysis is to look at specific regimes under similar contexts. Because we're technically still in the McNolan regime until the 2009 draft, it's probably of most interest for you (and I) to see how McNolan compares to specific Patriot regimes. Beginning with the 1994 draft, there have been 3 such regimes:

1. Bill Parcells, 1994-1996
2. Bobby Grier, 1997-1999
3. Scott Pioli, 2000-2008

As I mentioned during the introduction to Part 3, it turns out that NE has had overall team contexts similar to those of SF. All that's different are the dates on the calendar. Specifically, Parcells was the Bill Walsh I of NE, transforming a hapless franchise into a consistent contender. Grier was a combination of Policy and Donahue in that he unwound the pristine ball of yarn spun by Parcells. Finally, Pioli was a mixture of Walsh II and McNolan. He was charged with returning a once-proud franchise to its winning ways.

So the question is, "Which of the 3 NE regimes has McNolan been most similar to regarding draft strategy?"

But before I move on, I need to make one additional regime distinction. Further inspection of the Pioli regime makes you realize that it has actually encompassed two different team contexts, i.e., it's 2 different regimes rolled into 1. Pioli's drafts from 2000-2003 were of the dynasty-building variety, whereas his drafts from 2004-2008 were of the dynasty-sustaining variety. As my discussion of the Policy and Donahue regimes vis-à-vis the Walsh regime suggested, rebuilding drafts look a lot different than sustaining drafts. So when attempting to compare McNolan to the NE regimes, we have to consider Pioli as having had 2 different regimes (Pioli I & Pioli II) from 2000-2008. In other words, my question above revises to, "Which of the 4 NE regimes has McNolan been most similar to regarding draft strategy?"

To refresh your memory, here is the McNolan draft strategy I detailed in Part 2d of this series:

1. Stockpile picks when your team sucks, but trade away picks when (you think) your team is good.
2. Draft for need on Day 1, especially when your team sucks.
3. Use Day 2 to take a lot of bites at the apple.
4. BCS or die!
5. We're Goldilocks (aka Vanilla McNolan).

After the jump, I'll compare McNolan's draft strategy from 2005-2008 to 1 of the 4 Patriot regimes of the Patriots. Keep reading to find out which one. The lucky winner might surprise you...

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Way back in Part 1 of this series - which seems like forever ago - I broke down the 49ers' draft picks from 1994-2008 by round, position, and conference. Just to refresh everyone's memory, here was my description of the Niners' overall draft strategy:

1. When we're good, let's trade away picks. When we're bad, let's acquire more picks.
2. Trade up into the 1^st round using 2^nd-round picks. Trade down into the 6^th and 7^th rounds using 5^th-round picks.
3. Take players from BCS conferences.
4. Dominate the neighborhood (i.e., take Pac-10 players).
5. Wait until Day 2 to draft QBs, RBs, and WRs.
6. Grab TEs, LBs, and DBs in the late rounds for depth and special teams.
7. Don't pull an Al Davis (i.e., Ks and Ps are not draft-worthy).

Today, I'll conduct a point-by-point comparison of this strategy to that of the New England Patriots. Why the Patriots, you ask? Well, the goal here was to find a team that, unlike the 49ers, has actually won a lot during the past 15 years, has done so consistently throughout those 15 years, and has done so in similar contextual circumstances. The specific criteria for identifying a team with which to compare were (a) having a top-3 winning percentage in the Salary Cap Era, (b) having won multiple championships in the Salary Cap Era, (c) having had 5 or more years between Super Bowl appearances in the Salary Cap Era, and (d) having regime contexts that were similar to the 49ers.

Given these criteria, NE is the only team that qualifies. Regarding criterion (a), the top 3 teams in winning percentage since 1994 are NE (65.0%), PIT (62.9%), and GB (62.1%). Regarding criterion (b), the only teams that have won multiple Super Bowls since 1994 are NE (3), PIT (2), and DEN (2). That narrows it down to NE and PIT. Regarding criterion (c), the only teams to have played in multiple Super Bowls separated by 5 years or more are NE (1996 and 2001), PIT (1995 and 2005), and NYG (2000 and 2007). So it comes down to criterion (d), which favors NE. That's because, whereas PIT has had a pretty stable organizational hierarchy (2 draft regimes, 2 coaches, 1 owner in 15 years), NE has had management turmoil (3 draft regimes, 3 coaches, and 2 owners in 15 years) similar to the 49ers. Not to mention that NE also had a Donahue/Erickson-esque "Does this team have a clue?" period from 1997-1999 when Bobby Grier was fully in charge of the draft (i.e., finally free of Bill Parcells' watchful eye, ala Donahue free from Walsh) and Pete Carroll was ineptly manning the sidelines (ala Erickson). So, taken together, NE is the best comparison because they've had a similar team context during the Salary Cap Era, yet actually have consistently won despite it, wholly unlike the 49ers.

Alright, so without further ado, let's start the draft strategy comparison...

After the jump, I'll compare each aspect of the 49ers' draft strategy in the Salary Cap Era to that of the Patriots...

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AUTHOR'S NOTE: Sorry about the delay in getting this one posted. My computer crashed yesterday because a genius (aka me) let the battery run out, so I had to wait until it fully recharged (aka today) to continue writing up the piece.

Yesterday, in Part 2c of my review of 49er draft history, I broke down the Donahue regime's picks from 2002-2004 by round, position, and conference. Just to refresh everyone's memory, here was my description of Donahue's draft strategy:

1. Stockpile picks, especially when your team sucks.
2. Draft for need on Day 1, especially when your team sucks.
3. I <3 the Pac-10!
4. BCS or die!

In comparison with the Walsh II and Policy regimes, Donahue didn't make the Policy regime mistake of trading away picks when the team was good (2002), he used Walsh II's strategy of drafting for need on Day 1 when rebuilding, he brought back the Policy regime's affinity for Pac-10 players, and he surpassed both Walsh II and the Policy regime in percentage of picks that came from BCS conferences

In this article, I'll be ending the regime breakdowns with a look at the McNolan era (2005-2008).

After the jump, I'll put the McNolan drafts in context; break the results down by position, draft day, and conference; sum up the regimes; and provide the idiot's guide to McNolan draft strategy...

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Yesterday, in Part 2b of my review of 49er draft history, I broke down the Walsh II regime's picks from 1999-2001 by round, position, and conference. Just to refresh everyone's memory, here was my description of Walsh II's draft strategy:

1. Stockpile picks when your team sucks.
2. Draft for need on Day 1, especially when your team sucks.
3. This is the pros, not college. There's no need to dominate your neighborhood.
4. Focus Day 2 on non-BCS players because even one diamond in the rough more than makes up for several lumps of coal.

And, in comparison, here was the Policy regime's draft strategy that I detailed in Part 2a:

1. Draft picks are commodities best used for moving up.
2. Once you've addressed positional needs in free agency, there's no need to focus on them in the draft.
3. Dominate the neighborhood (i.e., take Pac-10 players and those near Youngstown, OH).
4. There's plenty of talent outside the BCS conferences, but wait until Day 2 to acquire it.

So basically, the main differences between the two regimes were (a) Walsh II used the draft to rebuild the roster, whereas the Policy regime used the draft to tinker around the edges of the roster; (b) Walsh II drafted for need (esp. on Day 1), whereas the Policy regime didn't; and (c) Walsh II didn't have a geographical bias, whereas the Policy regime did. As I said in Part 2b, difference (a) is no doubt due, in some part, to differences in context. Nevertheless, it's still a difference worth noting, and it's overshadowed by differences (b) and (c), which have nothing to do with context.

I bring up both of these draft strategies because they can serve as opposite ends of a draft strategy continuum going forward. In other words, because they're such polar opposites, we can use them as draft strategy templates with which to describe the Donahue and McNolan strategies. Speaking of Donahue, his regime's drafts are the topic of this article.

After the jump, I'll put the Donahue drafts in context; break the results down by position, draft day, and conference; and provide the idiot's guide to Donahue draft strategy...

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